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Probation Revocations as Delayed
Dispositional Departures: Why Blakely v.




Imagine being convicted of a crime that carries a presumptive
sentence of probation; later you are found in violation of the terms
by intentionally contacting the victim. You dispute the grounds of
the revocation arguing that you never contacted the victim.
However, under your state's sentencing scheme, a judge
determines whether the conditions of probation are violated by a
preponderance of the evidence and, therefore, may send
individuals to prison. Despite vehement objections to the judge
that he or she cannot send you to prison without a jury finding
beyond a reasonable doubt that you contacted the victim, the judge
finds that the conditions of your probation have been violated and
executes your sentence.
Criminal defendants have the right, at trial, to have a jury
determine beyond a reasonable doubt facts necessary to convict
them.' After Blakely v. Washington,2 it is now known that the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial extends to sentencing
proceedings. This requirement notably extends to situations
where a judge wants to depart from the sentence set forth in that
state's sentencing guidelines, including extending the length of
time a defendant serves. However, the requirement does not
appear to apply to a determination of how the defendant serves his
" J.D. expected 2006, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2000, Drew
University. I am particularly grateful to Ben Butler and the Minnesota State
Public Defender's office for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. I am also
grateful to Professor Richard Frase for helping me develop the topic of this Article.
Finally, thanks to my parents, Dean and Jan Ikeda, for their encouragement and
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1. United States v. Howard, 420 F.2d 142, 144 (1969) (declaring that this right
is "[ilmplicit in the right to trial by jury afforded criminal defendants under the
[S]ixth [A]mendment").
2. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
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or her time. Yet in probation revocations, where the defendant is
initially placed on probation rather than imprisoned, judges are
given unilateral discretion to execute a stayed sentence and
commit a criminal defendant to incarceration.' This Article argues
that probation revocations are the functional equivalent of delayed
dispositional departures. This Article will refer to an extension of
the time a defendant is required to serve as a durational
departure. An increase in duration will be referred to as an
upward durational departure, and a decrease in duration will be
referred to as a downward durational departure. A modification of
how a defendant serves his or her sentence will be referred to as a
dispositional departure. Instances where a judge requires a
defendant to serve a sentence in prison when the guidelines called
for probation will be referred to as an upward dispositional
departure. The opposite, where a judge places the defendant on
probation when that defendant should have been imprisoned, will
be referred to as a downward dispositional departure.
Because probation revocations are essentially dispositional
departures that occur at a different time, the probation revocation
scheme is untenable in light of Blakely because juries should be
required to find facts beyond a reasonable doubt to ensure the
accuracy of the revocation. This Article begins by discussing the
procedural requirements in probation revocation cases. It will
then discuss cases that preceded and, in certain instances,
foreshadowed Blakely. Following the pre-Blakely Supreme Court
jurisprudence discussion, this Article will examine how states with
determinate schemes incorrectly followed these Supreme Court
holdings. This Article will then describe the holding in Blakely
and how states with determinate sentencing schemes have
addressed the Blakely decision. Finally, this Article will explore
the impact of Blakely on dispositional departures and argue that
Blakely applies to dispositional departures and, as the next logical
step, to probation revocation hearings.
I. Sentencing Before Blakely
Before Blakely, judges could impose sentences that departed
from the presumptive sentence under that state's guidelines if
there were "substantial and compelling" factors present to justify
the departure,4 such as prior convictions. In Kansas, at least, that
3. See infra notes 9-20 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., State v. Geller, 665 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Minn. 2003) (holding that a
court must specify on the record the substantial and compelling reasons for
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radically changed in 2000 with the United States Supreme Court
decision, Apprendi v. New Jersey.5 Apprendi allowed judges to
consider defendants' prior convictions only to pronounce a
sentence in excess of the statutory maximum.6 Any further fact for
departure must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.'
The following section examines the pre-Blakely decisions of the
United States Supreme Court and state courts of jurisdictions
with determinate sentencing schemes.8
A. Probation Revocations in a Pre-Blakely World
One of the most important cases related to a defendant's
rights at probation revocation hearings, and the appropriate
starting point of this Article, is Morrissey v. Brewer.9 Morrissey
explained the minimum due process requirements necessary at
probation revocation hearings."0  The minimum due process
requirements set forth by Morrissey are
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b)
disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c)
opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses
and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e)
a "neutral and detached" hearing body such as a traditional
parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or
lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to
the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. 1
In the term following Morrissey, the United States Supreme
Court decided Gagnon v. Scarpelli." Gagnon further explained the
Court's holding in Morrissey and addressed a defendant's right to
counsel at a probation revocation hearing. 3 In Gagnon, the Court
departure).
5. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
6. Id. at 490.
7. "[A]ny fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum
penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 476 (citing Jones v. United States, 526
U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)).
8. See infra notes 9-20.
9. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
10. Id. at 488-89.
11. Id. at 489.
12. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
13. Id. at 790 ("We thus find no justification for a new inflexible constitutional
rule with respect to the requirement of counsel. We think, rather, that the decision
as to the need for counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis in the exercise of a
sound discretion by the state authority charged with responsibility for
administering the probation and parole system.").
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held that defendants are not entitled to counsel as a per se rule but
that trial courts must determine the need for counsel on a case-by-
case basis. 4 Importantly, the Court distinguished between a
criminal prosecution and a probation revocation hearing, thus
justifying the different levels of due process protection in each
hearing." Probation revocations, the Court observed, are not a
part of the criminal prosecution because the defendant has already
been found guilty and is granted only conditional liberty, and, as
such, defendants in probation revocations are not entitled to all of
the due process rights afforded to criminal defendants. 6
In Morrissey and Gagnon, the Court limited the scope of
procedural requirements in probation revocations, but in 2002, the
Court decided Alabama v. Shelton, 7 which dealt with procedural
rights in probation revocations that may impact the due process
limitations set forth in Morrissey and Gagnon. Shelton involved a
defendant's right to counsel." The Court held that a defendant
cannot be imprisoned if the defendant was unrepresented at trial,
even if the defendant faced a stayed sentence."' Defendants, then,
are at least entitled to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
under due process when facing probation and a stayed
incarceration sentence .2
14. Id.
15. Id. at 781 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)) (holding
"that the revocation of parole is not a part of a criminal prosecution"). Note also
that the Court does not distinguish between probation revocation and parole
revocation hearings. Id. at 782. As such, any reference to "probation revocations"
in this Article shall also include "parole revocations."
16. Id. at 781. The Court, however, did observe that the revocation of probation
does entail the loss of liberty and, therefore, some due process must be afforded.
Id.
Specifically, we held that a parolee is entitled to two hearings, one a
preliminary hearing at the time of his arrest and detention to
determine whether there is probable cause to believe that he has
committed a violation of his parole, and the other a somewhat more
comprehensive hearing prior to the making of the final revocation decision.
Id. at 781-82.
17. 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
18. Id. at 657.
19. Id. at 674. The Court rejected the state's argument that this would unduly
hamper its ability to "impose effective probationary punishment," and sought to
appoint counsel only at the probation revocation stage. Id. at 666-68.
20. In Shelton, the defendant represented himself at a bench trial and "was
convicted of third-degree assault, a class A misdemeanor carrying a maximum
punishment of one year imprisonment and a $2000 fine," id. at 658, pursuant to
sections 13A-6-22, 13A-5-7(a)(1), 13A-5-12(a)(1) of the Alabama Code. Id. The
circuit court then sentenced Shelton to thirty days in the county jail, but suspended
the sentence and placed Shelton on two years of unsupervised probation. Id. at 658-
59. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that a suspended sentence "does
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B. "Other Than the Fact of a Prior Conviction..."
In 2000, the United States Supreme Court decided Apprendi
v. New Jersey.2' In Apprendi, the Court held that "other than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt."22
States with sentencing guidelines, with the exception of Kansas,
believed that this language meant that judges could continue to
make durational departures from sentencing guidelines as long as
the resultant sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum set
forth by the legislature. 2
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court decided two cases
implicated by Apprendi: Ring v. Arizona 4 and Harris v. United
not trigger the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel unless there is
'evidence in the record that the [defendant] has actually been deprived of liberty.'"
Id. at 659 (alteration in original). The Alabama Supreme Court reversed and held
that "a suspended sentence constitute[d] a 'term of imprisonment' within the
meaning of Argersinger and Scott even though incarceration is not immediate or
inevitable." Id. Shelton makes clear that a defendant is entitled to due process, at
least as it relates to representation by counsel before being incarcerated. Id.
21. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Apprendi involved a sentencing enhancement statute
where the defendant could receive twenty years imprisonment if his crime was
motivated by racial bias. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (2001); id. at 468. The
defendant pled guilty to two offenses: second-degree possession of a firearm for an
unlawful purpose in violation of section 2C:39-4a of the New Jersey statutes and
third-degree unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb, in violation of section
2C:39-3a. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469-70. The remaining twenty counts were
dismissed. Id. at 470. The prosecutor reserved the right to argue for enhancement
of Apprendi's sentence under section 2C:44-3(e), namely, that Apprendi's offense
was committed with a biased purpose. Id. Apprendi reserved the right to challenge
the enhancement's constitutionality. Id. The trial judge rejected Apprendi's
unconstitutionality argument and sentenced Apprendi to twelve years on one
count, a penalty that was two years greater than the maximum for the offense to
which he admitted. Id. at 470-71. Apprendi appealed, arguing that the trial court's
finding of bias must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in order to
enhance his sentence. Id. (citing State v. Apprendi, 698 A.2d 1265 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1997)). The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed Apprendi's conviction
and sentence. State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 486 (N.J. 1999).
22. 530 U.S. at 489.
23. See, e.g., State v. Grossman, 636 N.W.2d 545, 551 (Minn. 2001) (reducing
the defendant's forty year sentence as a patterned sex offender to thirty years, the
statutory maximum for first-degree criminal sexual conduct). But see State v.
Gould, 23 P.3d 801, 804 (Kan. 2001) (holding that upward departures under the
Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act are unconstitutional if the facts necessary to
depart durationally are not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt). The
Kansas courts, however, found that Apprendi did not apply to dispositional
departures. State v. Carr, 53 P.3d 843, 845 (Kan. 2002) (holding that Apprendi does
not require jury findings when the court is executing a presumptively stayed
sentence).
24. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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States.2' Ring, applying the rule announced in Apprendi, required
that capital defendants receive jury determination of facts
necessary to impose the death penalty where the statute
prescribed life imprisonment." Under the Arizona statute,
"[biased solely on the jury's verdict finding Ring guilty of first-
degree felony murder, the maximum punishment he could have
received was life imprisonment."27 Ring was the first United
States Supreme Court case that hinted that Apprendi's definition
of "statutory maximum" may not be the maximum penalty set
forth in the statute, but may be the sentence that must be imposed
absent additional findings.2"
In Harris v. United States,29 a case that upheld judicial
findings of fact to impose mandatory minimum sentences, the
Court held that the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence
did not violate Apprendi because its imposition was below the
statutory maximum and, therefore, authorized by the jury's
verdict. ° Unlike the rule announced in Ring that initially hinted
at the interpretation of Apprendi announced by Blakely, Harris
indicated that the meaning of statutory maximum is not what is
allowed under the guidelines, but is instead the maximum
sentence set forth in the statute. 3'
25. 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
26. 536 U.S. at 588. Ring was initially charged with premeditated murder and
felony murder. Id. at 591. The jury was split evenly on the premeditated murder
charge, six to six, and convicted on the felony murder charge. Id. Ring was found
guilty of felony murder, but not premeditated murder. Id. at 592. "Under Arizona
law, Ring could not be sentenced to death, the statutory maximum penalty for first-
degree murder, unless further findings were made." Id. The prosecution presents
evidence of aggravating factors, and the defendant presents evidence of mitigating
factors. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703C (West. Supp. 2001)). Those
aggravating factors, the Court held, must be found by a jury in order to comply
with the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 608-09.
27. Id. at 597.
28. See id.
29. 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
30. Id. at 565.
31. This appeared to be the correct predictive reading of Ring and Harris. Ring
dealt with a sentencing statute that allowed life imprisonment unless other facts
were found. 536 U.S. at 592. But in Harris, even if the minimum sentence
exceeded the top-of-the-box presumptive sentence under the federal guidelines, the
sentence still appeared to be appropriate because the judge could impose any
sentence up to the statutory maximum. 536 U.S. at 554 ("Since the subsections
alter only the minimum, the judge may impose a sentence well in excess of seven
years, whether or not the defendant brandished the firearm."). These holdings
appear inconsistent with Blakely's interpretation of the Apprendi rule, that the
statutory maximum meant the top of the box presumptive sentence.
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C. "Other Than the Fact of a Prior Conviction..."
Incorrectly Interpreted
Following Apprendi many state courts failed to interpret
correctly the holding in Apprendi that any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime, besides a prior conviction, must be submitted
to a jury.2 Minnesota, a state 'With sentencing guidelines, held
post-Apprendi that a jury's guilty verdict allowed a judge to
sentence a defendant up to the statutory maximum despite the
presence of sentencing guidelines that place the presumptive
sentence lower than the statutory maximum.3
Kansas, on the other hand, interpreted Apprendi's holding
correctly in light of Blakely. In State v. Gould,34 the state supreme
court held that Apprendi applied in cases where the statutory
maximum was not exceeded, but only the presumptive sentence
under the sentencing guidelines was exceeded. 35  The Kansas
32. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); see, e.g., State v.
Grossman, 636 N.W.2d 545, 551 (Minn. 2001) (holding that the imposition of a forty
year sentence for first-degree criminal sexual conduct violates Apprendi because it
exceeds the statutory maximum by ten years without a jury finding that Grossman
was a patterned sex offender). In Grossman, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted
that the jury's verdict exposed the defendant to a sentence of thirty years under
subdivision two of section 609.342 of Minnesota's criminal sexual conduct statute.
Id. at 550. That interpretation, however, is inconsistent with Blakely because the
maximum penalty authorized by law is the maximum the judge may impose
without additional factual findings. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537
(2004) ("In other words, the relevant 'statutory maximum' is not the maximum
sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he
may impose without any additional findings."). Grossman's maximum sentence
was not the thirty years under the statute, but was the maximum sentence in the
grid of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines because that was the most that the
judge could sentence Grossman to without additional aggravating factor findings.
See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES
AND COMMENTARY § IV, 47-48 (2002), available at
http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/guidelines/guide02.pdf; Eric C. Hallstrom, Recent
Decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court: State v. Grossman: The Minnesota
Supreme Court Applies Apprendi to Minnesota's Patterned Sex Offender Statute,
But What Lies Ahead?, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 411, 418 (2002) (observing that
due process requires findings by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt to impose a
sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum set forth in the criminal sexual
conduct statute and not the sentencing guidelines); see also People v. Chanthaloth,
743 N.E.2d 1043, 1050 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (limiting the Apprendi holding to
instances where the statutory maximum for that particular crime is exceeded).
33. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
34. 23 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2001).
35. Id. at 812-13. The court in Gould observed:
Under Apprendi, it does not matter how the required finding is labeled,
but whether it exposes the defendant to a greater punishment that that
Law and Inequality [Vol. 24:157
Supreme Court thus presciently decided Gould in compliance with
one of Blakely's central holdings, that the statutory maximum for
Apprendi purposes was the top-of-the-box of the sentencing grid. 6
II. Blakely: What the Court Really Meant by "Statutory
Maximum"
A. Blakely: We Really Meant the Top of the Range Under the
Guidelines
In 1998, Washington State charged Ralph Howard Blakely
with first-degree kidnapping under section 9A.40.020(1) of the
Washington Statutes.37 Blakely kidnapped his wife, bound her
with duct tape, and placed her into a wooden box at knifepoint
while asking her to dismiss pending divorce and trust
proceedings. 8
Pursuant to a plea agreement reached with the state, Blakely
pled guilty to second-degree kidnapping involving domestic
violence and use of a firearm. 39 On the record, Blakely "admitt[ed]
the elements of second-degree kidnapping and the domestic-
violence and firearm allegations, but no other relevant facts."' °
The statutory maximum sentence in Washington for second-degree
kidnapping, a class B felony, was ten years of imprisonment.4 ' The
Washington Sentencing Reform Act established statutory
authorized by the jury's verdict. Gould's jury verdict "authorized" a
sentence of 31-34 months for each child abuse conviction. By imposing two
68-month sentences, the district court went beyond the maximum sentence
in the applicable grid box and exposed Gould to punishment greater than
that authorized by the jury's verdict.
Id. (internal citations omitted). See generally Steven J. Crossland, Durational and
Dispositional Departures Under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act: The Kansas
Supreme Court's Uneasy Passage Through Apprendi-land, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 687
(2003) (explaining the Gould decision); Kansas Sentencing Commission Report to
the 2002 Kansas Legislature, 15 FED. SENT'G. REP. 32 (Oct. 2002) (explaining the
Gould holding that departures exceeding the prescribed grid sentence violated
Apprendi and suggesting possible legislative solutions).
36. Gould, 23 P.3d at 812-13; see Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537
(2004) (holding that the maximum sentence for Apprendi purposes is the maximum
a judge may impose absent additional fact finding).
37. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2534.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2534. Blakely pled guilty to those charges in violation of sections
9A.40.030(1), 10.99.0202(e)(p), and 9.94A.125 of the Washington statutes. Blakely,
124 S. Ct. at 2534.
40. Id. at 2535.
41. Id.; WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9A.40.030(3) (2000) (classifying second-degree
kidnapping as a class B felony); WASH REV. STAT. ANN. § 9A.20.021(1)(b) (2000)
(establishing the maximum term for a class B felony at ten years of imprisonment).
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guidelines that must be followed when sentencing a criminal
defendant.42 The presumptive sentence for Blakely under the Act
was between forty-nine and fifty-three months.43
In accordance with the plea agreement, the state asked the
trial court to impose a sentence within the statutory guideline
range of forty-nine to fifty-three months." Following the victim's
testimony, the court, on its own, imposed an exceptional sentence 5
of ninety months, thirty-seven months beyond the maximum set
forth under the sentencing guidelines. 46 The trial court based its
departure on several factors, including "deliberate cruelty," a
statutorily enumerated departure factor in domestic violence
cases.4 7  Facing an additional thirty-seven months, Blakely
appealed on grounds that his Sixth Amendment right to a jury
determination beyond a reasonable doubt of all facts necessary to
give him a departure was violated.48 The sentence was affirmed by
the Washington Court of Appeals.4 '  The Washington Supreme
Court denied review.5 ° The United States Supreme Court granted
a writ of certiorari.5 1
The Court began its analysis by noting that it was simply
42. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535.
43. Id. Second-degree kidnapping is a seriousness level V crime. WASH. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9.94A.320 (2003) (recodified as WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.94A.515).
Based on the Washington statute, Blakely had an offender score of two, placing him
in box 2-V, which produced the sentencing range of thirteen to seventeen months.
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535 (citing WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9.94A.360,
9.94A.310(1) (2003) (recodified as WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9.94A.520, 9.94.510(1)
respectively)). Having also pled guilty to use of a firearm, Blakely's sentence was
subject to a thirty-six month firearm enhancement under the Washington statute.
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535 (citing WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.94A.310(3)(b) (2003))
(recodified as § 9.94A.510(3)(b)). Adding the thirteen to seventeen month range to
the thirty-six month firearm enhancement results in a presumptive sentence under
Washington's Sentencing Reform Act of forty-nine to fifty-three months. The
domestic violence conviction did not subject Blakely to additional time. Blakely, 124
S. Ct. at 2535 n.3 ("The domestic-violence stipulation subjected [Blakely] to such
measures as a 'no contact' order, see § 10.99.040, but did not increase the standard
range of his sentence.").
44. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535.
45. Washington state refers to "exceptional sentences." In this Article, I refer
to "exceptional sentences" as "departures."
46. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535.
47. Id.; WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.94A.390(2)(h)(iii) (2003) (re-codified as §
9.94A.535(2)(h)(iii)). The trial court initially listed other departure factors, but the
only factor affirmed on appeal was deliberate cruelty. Blakely v. Washington, 47
P.3d 149, 158-59, 159 n.3 (2002).
48. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536.
49. Id. (citing Blakely v. Washington, 47 P.3d 149, 161 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)).
50. Id. (citing Blakely v. Washington, 62 P.3d 889 (Wash. 2003)).
51. Blakely v. Washington, 540 U.S. 965 (2003).
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applying the rule it announced in Apprendi,52 that "[other than
the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.""5 The
Court believed that requirement was based on two tenets of
common law criminal jurisprudence: first, the truth of an
accusation should be confirmed unanimously by twelve peers and
second, the law requires as essential the facts necessary to
punish.54
The meaning of "statutory maximum" for Apprendi purposes
was a matter of dispute before Blakely.5 In Blakely, the state
argued that the "statutory maximum" was a ten year maximum
for class B felonies." The Court, however, corrected that mistake
by stating, "[o]ur precedents make clear . . . that the 'statutory
maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the
jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."57 Here, the judge could
not have imposed a ninety month sentence based solely on
Blakely's guilty plea, but could reach only the top-of-the-box
sentence of fifty-three months."5
The Court then explained that its "commitment to Apprendi
in this context reflects not just respect for longstanding precedent,
but the need to give intelligible content to the right of jury trial.""5
The Court further explained that there are only two alternatives
for those who reject Apprendi. ° The first alternative is that
rejecting Blakely's interpretation of Apprendi would allow the
state to label elements of the crime for the jury to decide and
52. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536 ("This case requires us to apply the rule we
expressed in Apprendi v. New Jersey.. ").
53. Id. (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).
54. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536.
55. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
56. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537.
57. Id. ("In other words, the relevant 'statutory maximum' is not the maximum
sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he
may impose without any additional findings.") (emphasis in original); see also
Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 316, 317
(2004) ("After Blakely, however, the relevant 'statutory maximum' that the judge
'may impose without any additional findings' is the top of the range designated for
the offense of conviction alone, 0-6 months. Any additional finding triggering a
higher range . . . must be either admitted or proven beyond a reasonable doubt.")
(citation omitted).
58. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537-38.
59. Id. at 2538.
60. Id. at 2539.
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sentencing factors for the judge based on legislative labels.61 The
second alternative is that the "legislature may establish legally
essential sentencing factors" that could result in a sentencing
factor becoming the "tail which wags the dog of the substantive
offense."" The Court concluded that neither alternative was
feasible because the Framers did not intend for judges and the
legislature to have this much discretion.63
The Court then explained that it was not invalidating
determinate sentencing schemes.64  Indeterminate sentencing
schemes do not infringe on the province of the jury, unlike
determinate sentencing schemes. 65  Determinate schemes
implicate a defendant's right to a specific sentence absent
additional facts, and this fact-finding is precisely what is protected
by the Sixth Amendment.6 6
The dissent charged that Blakely would benefit judges and
deprive defendants of the ability to argue sentencing factors to a
judge.67 The majority characterized the first charge as mere
speculation and the second as incorrect.6  The Court noted that
the Kansas cases indicate that the opposite of the dissent's charges
may be true. 9 The Court observed that defendants are not
deprived of the ability to argue sentencing factors to a judge,
61. Id. The Court held that this alternative is unpalatable because "[tihe jury
could not function as circuitbreaker in the State's machinery of justice if it were
relegated to making a determination that the defendant at some point did
something wrong, a mere preliminary to a judicial inquisition into the facts of the
crime the State actually seeks to punish." Id.
62. Id. (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)). The problem
with this alternative is that it is too subjective, according to the Court. Blakely, 124
S. Ct. at 2539.
63. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2540 ("We think that claim not plausible at all,
because the very reason the Framers put a jury-trial guarantee in the Constitution
is that they were unwilling to trust government to mark out the role of the jury.").
64. Id. ("By reversing the judgment below, we are not, as the State would have
it, 'fmd[ing] determinate sentencing schemes unconstitutional.' This case is not
about whether determinate sentencing is constitutional, only about how it can be
implemented in a way that respects the Sixth Amendment.") (alteration in original)
(citation omitted).
65. Id. The Sixth Amendment, according to the Court, "is not a limitation on
judicial power, but a reservation of jury power." Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2541 ("Justice O'C[onnor] simply assumes that the net effect will
favor judges, but she has no empirical basis for that prediction.").
68. Id.
69. Id. The Court observed that when Kansas courts determined that Apprendi
threatened its determinate sentencing scheme, the legislature did not abandon
determinate sentencing, but merely amended its policies to comply with Apprendi.
Id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4718 (Cum. Supp.) (2003)).
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because they can waive their Apprendi rights."
The Court concluded its opinion by addressing Justice
Breyer's dissent.71 Justice Breyer asserted that the majority's
holding would give prosecutors more elements to bargain with and
"undermin[e] alternatives to adversarial fact finding."72  The
majority rejected the first criticism as speculative73 and the second
as an attack on the jury trial system itself.74
The Court determined that fairness or efficiency of a jury
trial need not be considered.75 According to the Court, the fact that
a judge may discover facts better than a jury is not a value
judgment that could or need be made in this case.76 The Court
easily discarded the dissenters' position, noting, "as Apprendi held,
every defendant has the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to
a jury all facts legally essential to the punishment. Under the
dissenters' alternative, [the defendant] has no such right. That
should be the end of the matter."77
In the end, the Court held that Blakely was entitled to relief
because his sentence was thirty-seven months longer than the top-
of-the-box sentence he could have received under Washington's
Sentencing Reform Act.78  Blakely received a ninety month
sentence based on a judicial finding that he perpetrated his crime
with deliberate cruelty.79 That fact, however, was not found by a
jury and was not admitted in his plea.8 ° Further, Blakely did not
waive his right to have a jury determine aggravating factors.8 '
Because Blakely was denied a jury finding of aggravating factors,
and because he did not waive his right to do so, the Court reversed
Blakely's conviction and remanded for further proceedings
70. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2541.
71. Id. at 2541-43. Justice Breyer's first argument was that defendants would
be deprived of the ability to argue sentencing factors to a judge. Id. at 2541. This
Article addressed that criticism above. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
72. Id. at 2541-42.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2542-43.
75. Id. at 2543 ("Ultimately, our decision cannot turn on whether or to what
degree trial by jury impairs the efficiency or fairness of criminal justice.").
76. Id. ("Our Constitution and the common-law traditions it entrenches,
however, do not admit the contention that facts are better discovered by judicial
inquisition than by adversarial testing before a jury.").
77. Id.
78. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
79. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535; see supra note 47.
80. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2534-36.
81. Id. at 2536.
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consistent with the Court's application of the Sixth Amendment.82
B. Post-Blakely Correction
The Blakely decision forced jurisdictions that used
determinate sentencing schemes to deal with its implications.83
Kansas was the only state in the nation that anticipated correctly
the Court's interpretation of Apprendi.84  Other states, including
Minnesota, rushed to deal with its implications.85 It appears that
Minnesota, in light of Blakely, has abandoned its jurisprudence
that limited Apprendi to cases where the defendant's sentence
exceeded the statutory maximum.86
Blakely's applicability to dispositional departures appears
tenuous. The Kansas Supreme Court determined that Apprendi
did not apply to dispositional departures because a dispositional
departure does not increase the defendant's sentence. 7
82. Id. at 2543.
83. See King & Klein, supra note 57. Blakely threatens the presumptive
sentencing guidelines of no fewer than fourteen states. Id.
84. See State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801, 809-14; see also Kansas Sentencing
Commission Report to the 2002 Kansas Legislature, supra note 35, at 33-34
(proposing legislation that would require a jury determination of aggravating
circumstances based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a unanimous jury verdict,
and that "the sentencing court's decision would be based upon the jury's
determinations regarding aggravating circumstances").
85. In State v. Whitley, the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed Blakely and
remanded for resentencing not inconsistent with Blakely where the defendant's
sentence was based on a judicial finding that he was a patterned sex offender. 682
N.W.2d 691 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). Whitley was the first case in Minnesota to be
remanded on BlakelylApprendi grounds because the defendant received a sentence
that exceeded the presumptive sentence under the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, supra note 32, at § IV.
Subsequent cases have provided further elaboration. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 687
N.W.2d 393 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that to comply with Blakely, the factual
finding that defendant is a career offender must be found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt); see also Benjamin J. Butler, Blakely v. Washington and
Sentencing in Minnesota (October 13, 2004) (unpublished materials for
presentation, on file with Minnesota State Public Defender's Office) ("Maybe the
best way to think about sentencing in the post-Blakely world is this: the top-of-the-
box presumptive sentence is the absolute maximum sentence the judge can
impose.") (emphasis removed). The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission
has also issued long-term recommendations to the governor in light of Blakely.
Minn. Sentencing Guidelines Comm'n, The Impact of Blakely v. Washington on
Sentencing in Minnesota: Long Term Recommendations, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 146
(Dec. 2004).
86. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
87. In State v. Carr, the court restricted Apprendi's holding to durational
departures. 53 P.3d 843 (Kan. 2002). Specifically, the court held that "Apprendi,
and likewise Gould, only involved the imposition of an upward durational
departure sentence and did not encompass dispositional departures." Id. at 848. It
is when the duration of the sentence, according to the Carr court, exceeds the
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Minnesota, a late-comer to applying Apprendi to durational
departures, initially agreed with Kansas' determination and held
that Blakely did not apply to dispositional departures. 
8
Blakely's applicability to the federal sentencing guidelines
appears more doubtful following United States v. Booker.89 In
Booker, the Court held that Blakely applied to the federal
sentencing guidelines despite the statutory basis of Washington's
guidelines and the commission based guideline scheme in the
federal system." The Court's remedy, however, excised language
in the federal guidelines that made their application mandatory.9
Federal judges were now free to disregard the guidelines when
sentencing a defendant because the guidelines were now merely
advisory." The Court based this remedy on legislative intent.93
Thus, the remedy in Booker does not automatically extend to state
statutory maximum that Apprendi's protections are triggered. Id. Departing
dispositionally, the court held, does not extend the time served, but merely
"determines where an individual's sentence will be supervised." Id. at 849.
88. State v. Hanf, 687 N.W.2d 659 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). The court found that
dispositional departures did not require a Blakely sentencing jury determination
because decisions on a defendant's disposition were traditionally made by judges.
Id. at 664 ("The traditional role of the jury has never extended to determining
which offenders go to prison and which do not."). As to unamenability to probation,
the determinative factor in sentencing a defendant to probation or prison, the court
observed, "this tradition establishes that an offender's amenability or
unamenability to probation is not a 'fact,' within the meaning of Apprendi, that
increases the offender's penalty .... But an offender's unamenability to probation
is a judgment reached after consideration of a series of facts." Id. at 665. On
November 16, 2004, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court granted a petition for
review in State v. Allen, (No. A04-127), 2004 WL 1925881 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004)
(unpublished). Allen, like Hanf, deals with Blakely's impact on dispositional
departures. Allen, 2004 WL 1925881, at *1. It appears, then, that Minnesota's
highest court is prepared to decide definitively the issue of Blakely's impact on
dispositional departures. See State v. Hanf, 2004 MN. LEXIS 758, *1 (Minn. 2005)
(unpublished) (granting review of Minnesota Court of Appeals decision and staying
the appeal pending review of Allen).
89. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (interim ed.).
90. Id. at 749 ("As the dissenting opinions in Blakely recognized, there is no
distinction of constitutional significance between the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and the Washington procedures at issue in that case.").
91. Id. at 758-59 (requiring excision of two statutory provisions). One of the
provision is the statutory provision that "requires sentencing courts to impose a
sentence within the applicable Guidelines range." Id. at 744.
92. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. See also Debra Barayuga, Child
Porn Nets Jail Term, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Jan. 19, 2005, at
http://starbulletin.com/2005/01/19/news/story7.html ("Zerfoss is believed to be the
first person in Hawaii to benefit from the High Court ruling that made federal
sentencing guidelines in place for nearly two decades advisory but no longer
mandatory, said his attorney, Victor Bakke.").
93. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 768 ("[WMe believe that Congress would not have
authorized a mandatory system in some cases and a nonmandatory system in
others, given the administrative complexities that such a system would create.").
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sentencing guideline schemes because it is not clear that each
state legislature shared the same intent as Congress.
III. Probation Revocations, Dispositional Departures, and
Blakely's Applicability
This section argues that dispositional departures are
impacted by Blakely. Dispositional decisions are presumptively
set forth by sentencing guidelines. This section also argues that
probation revocations are the functional equivalent of dispositional
departures. "Delayed dispositional departures" is offered as a
term of art to describe the probation revocation function. It
follows, then, that probation revocations are implicated by the
Blakely decision because they are dispositional departures that
occur at a different time.
A. Blakely Impacts Dispositional Departures
Dispositional departures are impacted by the Blakely holding
because they are as much a part of sentencing guidelines as
durational departures.94 Dispositional departures are written into
sentencing guidelines and are inseparable from the guidelines
themselves.95  Facts must be found in order to depart
dispositionally.96 As such, those facts must be found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to comply with Blakely.
Under state sentencing guidelines, a grid typically includes
information such as duration and disposition.97 The inclusion of
disposition indicates that the way a criminal defendant serves his
or her sentence is as important as the duration of the sentence
served.99 There appears to be no distinction, at least in the
94. See Minn. Sentencing Guidelines Comm'n, supra note 85, at 150 ("Although
the Court in State v. Carr ruled that aggravated dispositional departures are not
subject to Apprendi and subsequently Blakely provisions, the Sentencing
Guidelines Commission believes that aggravated dispositional departures will be
subject to the [sic] Blakely in Minnesota.").
95. See supra note 94 and accompanying text; Crossland, supra note 35, at 711-
12.
96. See State v. Carr, 53 P.3d 843, 853 (Kan. 2002) (Six, J., dissenting) ("The
fact that Carr was not amenable to rehabilitation was a court-made finding by a
preponderance of the evidence. This court-made finding sends Carr to prison.").
97. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4701-4705 (1995); MINN. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES COMM'N, supra note 32, at 47-48, § IV (sentencing grid of Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission).
98. See Carr, 53 P.3d at 853 (Six, J., dissenting) ("The provisions of the KSGA
read together make clear that the presumptive sentence for a crime is not only
defimed by the numbers in the grid box alone, but also by whether the box lies
above or below the dispositional line."); MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N,
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sentencing grid, of the import of duration over disposition.99
1. Hanf s Historical Justification Cannot Be Sustained
Minnesota and Kansas attempted to distinguish dispositional
departures from the Blakely holding by conducting a tortured
comparison of factors used to depart durationally versus
dispositionally."°° Both Hanf, in Minnesota, and Carr, in Kansas,
cannot withstand scrutiny.
Hanf attempted to distinguish dispositional determination by
finding that the decision as to disposition is more like an
indeterminate sentencing scheme than a determinate sentencing
scheme.'01 This meant that a criminal defendant was not entitled
to a particular disposition, and, as a result, Blakely was not
implicated. 10 2 Hanf set forth three responses to the defendant's
argument that he had a right to a stayed sentence because it was
presumptive under the guidelines:' 2
First, the presumptive disposition is determined in large
degree by the defendant's criminal history score .... Second,
the "right" referred to in Blakely must arise from the jury's
verdict, and that verdict historically has never determined
sentence dispositions, at least since courts acquired the
authority to stay sentences. Third, while the elements of the
offense found by the jury help determine what is a "typical"
offense warranting the presumptive duration, Minnesota
courts have not attempted to define what is a "typical"
offender to serve as a baseline for the proper disposition of any
supra note 32, at 19-20, § II.C ("The offenses within the Sentencing Guidelines Grid
are presumptive with respect to the duration of the sentence and whether
imposition or execution of the felony sentence should be stayed.") (emphasis added).
But see Carr, 53 P.3d at 850 ("Probation and parole are dispositions alternate to the
serving of a sentence, and neither probation nor parole increase or decrease the
sentence required to be imposed by statute.").
99. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. Nowhere in the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines is there any statement that duration is more important than
disposition. In fact, it appears that they are to be treated with equal weight.
MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, supra note 32, at 19-21, § II.C; see also id.
at 21-22, §§ II.C.01-02.
100. See State v. Hanf, 687 N.W.2d 659 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); Carr, 53 P.3d at
843.
101. Hanf, 687 N.W.2d at 664 ('The relevance of this history to the Blakely issue
is plain. Dispositional departures based on individual offender characteristics are
like the traditional sentencing judgments made by judges in indeterminate
sentencing schemes."). Dispositional departures survive Blakely analysis when
judges make fact determinations because Blakely upheld indeterminate sentencing
schemes. Id. (citing Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2540 (2004)).
102. See Hanf, 687 N.W.2d at 664.
103. Id.
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type of offense.0 4
Even if the Minnesota Court of Appeals was correct when it
stated that "the presumptive disposition is determined in large
degree by the defendant's criminal history score,"1"' the court itself
admitted that there are other factors that historically played a
significant role in determining disposition."' The court instead
chose to rely on an unsupported, conclusory statement: "We
conclude that the determination of amenability or unamenability
to probation is not the determinate, structured fact-finding that
Blakely holds the jury must perform." 7  As to the second,
historical factor, the court did not account for a change in case law,
namely Blakely, that had the possibility of fundamentally altering
the dispositional determination." Instead, it merely recited the
history of dispositional determinations and held that Blakely did
not apply because, historically, juries never determined
disposition." Finally, the court determined that dispositional
decisions are not implicated by Blakely because there is no
"typical" offender baseline to guide juries. The court failed to note
that juries generally are not told what "typical" offenses may look
like, yet they apparently are given the power to find aggravating
factors based on a departure factor such as "deliberate cruelty"
that would increase a sentence duration. 11
Not only did Hanf fail to distinguish adequately dispositional
departures from durational departures that it admitted were
impacted by the rules announced in Apprendi and Blakely, but the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission believed that
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 665 ("But an offender's unamenability to probation is a judgment
reached after consideration of a series of facts.").
107. Id.
108. Id. at 664.
109. Id. (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989)) ("The
traditional role of the jury has never extended to determining which offenders go to
prison and which do not. Traditionally, courts and parole officials made 'their
respective sentencing and release decisions upon their own assessments of the
offender's amenability to rehabilitation.'").
110. See id. at 665. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines also provide a non-
exhaustive list of proper departure factors. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
COMM'N, supra note 32, at 25-29, § l.D. Despite these offense-based comparisons
that must be done by the jury, the Minnesota Court of Appeals still does not have a
problem with durational departures. See Hanf, 687 N.W.2d at 665; see also Butler,
supra note 85, at 2 ("Dispositional departures require additional fact-finding (of
aggravating factors) just like durational departures. These too are unconstitutional
under Blakely.").
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dispositional departures were implicated by Blakely."' The
commission spent several paragraphs explaining Kansas'
treatment of dispositional departures through an examination of
Carr but held in conclusion, "although the Court in State v. Carr
ruled that aggravated dispositional departures are not subject to
Apprendi and subsequently Blakely provisions, the Sentencing
Guidelines Commission believes that aggravated dispositional
departures will be subject to the [sic] Blakely in Minnesota.""1
2. Carr's "Act of Grace" Justification Cannot Be Sustained
In Carr, the Kansas Supreme Court held that upward
dispositional departures were not implicated by Apprendi because
probation was an "act of grace," distinct from the sentence given to
a defendant."' That argument fails under scrutiny for two
reasons. First, sentencing guidelines specifically include
presumptive dispositions. Second, a prison term is indeed a more
serious disposition than a probation term, thus implicating
Apprendi and Blakely.
Whether a state's guideline system is promulgated by statute
or commission, the distinction between stayed and imposed
sentences remains."4 Dispositional sentences are presumptive in
the same way that durational sentences are presumptive."' No
111. Minn. Sentencing Guidelines Comm'n, supra note 85, at 150; see infra note
116.
112. Minn. Sentencing Guidelines Comm'n, supra note 85, at 150. While the
report of the commission admittedly does not have binding effect, it has persuasive
authority. Id. at 146 ("The Sentencing Guidelines Commission brings forth these
recommendations that are advisory in nature, but are meant to serve as a road
map until the full implications of Blakely work their way through the courts.").
113. State v. Carr, 53 P.3d 843, 850 (Kan. 2002); Crossland, supra note 35, at
708-09.
114. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. The Kansas system is set forth
by the legislature through statutes, while the Minnesota scheme is commission-
based. See supra note 97. In both Kansas and Minnesota, there exists a separation
of presumptive incarceration sentences from presumptive probation sentences.
Crossland, supra note 35, at 713 ("The mere existence of the dispositional line is a
strong indication that the Kansas legislature intended the district courts to adhere
to the distinction that the dispositional line represents."); see MINN. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES COMM'N, supra note 32, at 47, § IV. In Minnesota, the grid uses
shaded and non-shaded boxes that represent presumptive incarceration or
presumptive stayed sentences. Id. Non-shaded boxes represent presumptive
commitment to state imprisonment. Id. Shaded boxes represent presumptive
stayed sentences. Id.
115. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, supra note 32, at 19-21, § II.C
(noting that sentences are presumptive as to both duration and disposition);
Crossland, supra note 35, at 711 ("[It is sensible to consider that a grant of
presumptive probation for a felony offense subject to the KSGA constitutes a
sentence, and that the Kansas legislature intended this result in creating the
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basis exists for courts to distinguish between a durational and
dispositional departure when none is set forth in the guidelines."6
Because dispositional sentences have the same presumptive
weight in a sentencing guidelines grid, Blakely and Apprendi must
also impact dispositional departures and require a jury to find
facts beyond a reasonable doubt in order to depart.
Second, upward dispositional departures enhance the
severity of a defendant's sentence, again implicating Blakely and
Apprendi. It is undeniable that sentences of commitment to state
prison are more serious than stayed sentences of probation."' The
restrictions placed on individuals on probation versus those
incarcerated are significant."'
The United States Supreme Court in Blakely was not only
concerned about duration specifically but also appeared to be
concerned with severity in general." 9 Both Minnesota and Kansas
KSGA."),
116. It is important to note first that the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Commission believed that dispositional departures were affected by Blakely. MINN.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, supra note 32, at § rV; see also Butler, supra
note 85, at 2. The Kansas Sentencing Commission also believed that probation was
presumptive. See Crossland, supra note 35, at 712 ("Notably, the Sentencing
Commission embraces probation as a sentence in its annual report to the
legislature.").
117. See Carr, 53 P.3d at 851 (Six, J., dissenting) ("The qualitative difference
between prison and probation is obvious and striking."). Justice Six's dissent
continued: "while the demands of probation place certain restrictions on a person's
movements, these are very different from the restrictions of confinement in prison."
Id. (citing Hudson v. State, 42 P.3d 150 (2002)).
118. See Crossland, supra note 35, at 715. In his article, Crossland articulates
the differences between probation and prison:
The Kansas Supreme Court has acknowledged that there is a significant
difference between probation and prison. For example, an offender placed
on probation must accept certain limitations upon personal freedom, but
the offender may still move about freely in the community. The
probationer may generally work in the employment or career of his or her
choice, travel, vote, and engage in any lawful social activity to the extent
that court restrictions allow. In contrast, a person confined in prison
cannot participate in any of these basic societal activities.
Id. These differences, Crossland argues, are the bases against which it is
impossible to argue that a prison sentence is not an increased penalty beyond the
presumptive sentence where the presumptive sentence is a stayed sentence to
probation. Id.
119. See generally Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004). No mention is
made in Blakely of being limited to duration only. Relevant to this discussion is
Blakely's clear definition that "the relevant 'statutory maximum' is not the
maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the
maximum he may impose without any additional findings." Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at
2537. The Court continued, "when a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's
verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts... and the judge
exceeds his proper authority." Id. Whether a defendant is amenable to probation
appears to be the fact question that must be answered in order to determine
Law and Inequality [Vol. 24:157
now appear to be making the same mistake that most states made
in interpreting Apprendi too narrowly, given their recent Hanf and
Carr decisions.'"0 Just as Apprendi's holding was not limited solely
to instances where the statutory maximum for that particular
crime was exceeded, Blakely should not be read so narrowly as to
avoid application to dispositional departures. 2 ' In Blakely, the
Court made clear that when it said "statutory maximum" penalty,
it meant the most severe sentence authorized by the guidelines
grid.
1
Whether a defendant is incarcerated or placed on probation is
a weighty decision that impacts the seriousness of the penalty.
The dissent in Carr was correct in observing that this decision is
"obvious and striking."' Sentencing guidelines are written with
presumptive durations and dispositions.'2 4 Because incarceration
is more serious than probation and increases the penalty of the
offense, the dispositional decision, like the durational decision, is
implicated by the Blakely explanation of the rule announced in
Apprendi.125
disposition. See State v. Carr, 53 P.3d 843, 853 (Kan. 2002) (Six, J., dissenting);
State v. Hanf, 687 N.W.2d 659, 665 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) ("We conclude that the
determination of amenability or unamenability to probation is not the determinate,
structured fact-finding that Blakely holds the jury must perform.").
120. An example of Minnesota's incorrect application of Apprendi is the
Grossman case. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. In Grossman, the
Minnesota Supreme Court invalidated the defendant's sentence because it exceeded
the thirty year statutory maximum set forth in the criminal sexual conduct statute
and instead imposed the statutory maximum of thirty years, despite the
defendant's presumptive sentence under the guidelines being less than that. See
State v. Grossman, 636 N.W.2d, 545, 549-51 (Minn. 2001). We know now that this
interpretation was incorrect in light of Blakely. See supra note 119 and
accompanying text (discussing Blakely's definition of "statutory maximum"); see
also State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801, 814 (Kan. 2001) ("Apprendi dictates our conclusion
that Kansas' scheme for imposing upward departure sentences, embodied in K.S.A.
2000 Supp. 21-4716, violates the due process and jury trial rights contained in the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution."). For a
discussion of Hanf, see supra notes 100-111 and accompanying text. For a more
complete discussion of Carr, see supra notes 113-118 and accompanying text.
121. This Article is not assuming that simply because Blakely gave a more
expansive reading to Apprendi that it necessarily follows that a more expansive
reading should be given to the dispositional departure problem. Instead, this
Article argues that in light of Blakely's more expansive reading of the term
"statutory maximum," it should be even clearer that the presumptive disposition is
a part of the "statutory maximum" and cannot be increased absent jury findings
beyond a reasonable doubt. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
123. Carr, 53 P.3d at 851 (Six, J., dissenting).
124. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text.
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B. Probation Revocations Are Delayed Dispositional
Departures
The functional effect of probation revocations is
incarceration.'26 In an upward dispositional departure, a criminal
defendant is incarcerated instead of placed on probation. Thus,
the result of a probation revocation is the same as the result of an
upward dispositional departure. The temporal difference-that
probation revocations occur at some point after sentencing-is
insufficient to distinguish Blakely's requirements. 127  Probation
revocations thus are essentially delayed dispositional departures.
The result of a probation revocation is incarceration. 28
Generally, those placed on probation are given terms and
conditions to follow that, if violated, are grounds for the stay of
sentence to be revoked. 29 Whether one has followed the terms and
conditions is essentially a determination of amenability. 10  The
amenability versus unamenability determination is the hallmark
of the dispositional departure.1'
Probation revocations occur after a defendant has been
sentenced. Dispositional departures from the presumptive
disposition, under sentencing guidelines, occur at the conclusion of
the guilt phase of trial.132 The temporal difference, thus, appears
to be the only distinguishing characteristic between probation
revocations and dispositional departures.
133
126. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3716 (2004) (stayed sentence and probation
revocation statute); MINN. STAT. § 609.14 (2003) (revocation of stay statute). A
probation revocation revokes the stay that was granted at sentencing. Id.
127. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.14, subd. 1 (explaining that the grounds for
revocation include whether a defendant violated the terms and conditions of the
stayed sentence of probation). See generally Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 779-
80 (1973) (discussing probation revocation hearings and the grounds for
revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 472 (1972) (illustrating revocation
on grounds of another committed crime).
130. See State v. Hanf, 687 N.W.2d 659, 665-66 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing
amenability as the factor used for dispositional decisions, which is not a "fact" that
increases the defendant's penalty thus implicating Apprendi and Blakely).
131. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
132. See generally Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002) (discussing the
procedural process of sentencing and revocation generally throughout).
133. A countervailing argument that probation revocations do not deprive the
defendant of liberty because a sentence has already been pronounced is
unpersuasive. See Adam D. Young, Comment, An Analysis of the Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel as It Applies to Suspended Sentences and Probation: Do
Argersinger and Scott Blow a Flat Note on Gideon's Trumpet?, 107 DICK. L. REV.
699, 714-16 (2003). Defendants are, in fact, being deprived of something to which
they were entitled. In this context, they are entitled to remain unincarcerated as
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Difference in time cannot adequately distinguish a probation
revocation from a dispositional departure done at sentencing and,
as a result, remove it from protection under Blakely and
Apprendi.14  Time is simply not enough to defeat the argument
that probation revocations are not impacted by Blakely and
Apprendi. The fact that the dispositional departure occurs later
does not alter the substance of the decision.' 3' Because a difference
in the temporal point at which a criminal defendant with a
presumptive stayed sentence is incarcerated is not sufficient to
remove probation revocations from Blakely and Apprendi's reach,
probation revocations require juries to decide facts necessary to
revoke probation beyond a reasonable doubt.
3 6
C. Blakely Implicates Probation Revocations
Having accepted the first two premises as true, it becomes
inescapable that probation revocations are impacted by Blakely
and Apprendi. 7  Of course, one problem still exists. Probation
revocation case law has clearly delineated the procedural rights of
defendants at probation revocation hearings. In Morrissey, the
Court set forth the minimum due process requirements in
probation revocation hearings.' Following Morrissey, the Court
held that counsel was not required as a rule in probation
revocation hearings, but that the need would be determined on a
case-by-case basis.'39 Thirty years later, in 2002, the Court found




long as they do not violate the terms and conditions of their probation. However
that determination is made by a judge using a constitutionally permissible lower
standard of proof. Brian G. Bieluch, Thirty-First Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: IV. Sentencing: Probation, 90 GEO. L.J. 1813, 1826 (2002) ("Although the
government has the burden of persuasion at probation revocation hearings, the
government is not require[d] to prove probation violations beyond a reasonable
doubt.").
134. Young, supra note 133, at 716 ("Simply removing in time the
implementation of the prison sentence does not give it constitutional validity.").
135. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
136. In order for this conclusion to follow, one must assume that dispositional
departures are impacted by Blakely and require jury findings beyond a reasonable
doubt to depart upwardly.
137. See supra notes 94-136 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Of the six requirements set forth
in Morrissey, the right to a jury determination was not included. Id.
139. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. The Court did not want to
establish a bright line rule, but wanted to give judges discretion to decide whether
counsel was necessary and appropriate. Id.
140. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. Shelton required counsel at
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This historical overview highlights the fluid nature of
probation revocation hearing jurisprudence. 4 ' The fact that jury
trials were not afforded to criminal defendants at probation
revocations under Morrissey and Gagnon does not justify the
failure to extend the right in light of Blakely and Apprendi because
the right to counsel at the underlying offense stage was not
guaranteed until as recently as 2002 in Shelton.
The law in this area is ripe for change. Apprendi gave
criminal defendants the right to a jury trial where none existed
before.' Ring applied that rule in the context of the death
penalty, essentially finding that a shift from execution to life
imprisonment without parole is an upward departure and required
jury findings if the conviction alone does not support the
departure.' Shelton then expanded due process protections to
criminal defendants facing probation revocation by requiring
counsel at every stage of the process.4 And finally, Blakely held
that the statutory maximum that cannot be exceeded under
Apprendi meant the top of the range in determinate sentencing
schemes without a jury finding the facts necessary to depart
beyond a reasonable doubt.
14
This progression leads to the conclusion that the rule in
Apprendi can and will be further expanded to the area of probation
revocations. Blakely and Ring hinted at the Court's willingness to
expand the rule in Apprendi."4  Shelton indicated the Court's
willingness to expand due process protections in probation
revocation hearings.'47 The argument, then, that jury trials are
required under Blakely, Apprendi, and Shelton is both reasonable
and probable.
Conclusion
The Blakely and Apprendi cases demonstrate how patterns
emerge in the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence. At
first glance, it appears that Apprendi is limited to situations where
the underlying offense stage, where the defendant was initially placed on probation
because the sentence could never be executed and be in accord with a defendant's
right to counsel. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 37-82 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 143, 145 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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the statutory maximum is exceeded. 148 Ring, and later Blakely,
gave new meaning to the Apprendi holding by expanding its
reach. 149 Part of a guidelines' sentence is disposition; how one
serves his or her sentence is important after all. Dispositional
departures, then, should be regarded as implicated by Blakely's
more expansive language." ° Once dispositional departures are
included, the question of probation revocations becomes much
easier. Probation revocations are essentially dispositional
departures that occur at a later time; they can be thought of as
delayed dispositional departures. Temporal difference simply
cannot distinguish substance here.'5 ' As such, probation
revocations should be implicated by Blakely and Apprendi.
Imagine the accused, standing before the judge emphatically
arguing that he or she never violated the terms of his or her
probation. Pre-Blakely, Apprendi, and Shelton, it appeared that
the accused would be subject to execution of sentence unilaterally
by a judge, without counsel, and with the fact-finder using a
standard of proof lower than beyond a reasonable doubt. Shelton
held that those facing probation revocations were entitled to
counsel at the underlying offense hearing, even if that offense did
not expose them to a loss of liberty. Apprendi and Blakely give the
accused the right to have a jury determine the facts necessary to
revoke beyond a reasonable doubt.
Taken together, under Blakely, Apprendi, and Shelton, it is
reasonable to believe that the next logical step is to allow jury
determinations of facts necessary to revoke probation in probation
revocation hearings. Under this new rule, criminal defendants
will no longer be at the mercy of judges. Those facing probation
revocations, like all criminal defendants facing prison time, should
now have the procedural protections of twelve peers determining
whether aggravating factors exist beyond a reasonable doubt when
facing revocation of a stayed sentence.
148. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 24-28, 37-82 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 94-125 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 24:157
